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PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN
CONTEMPORARY LAW*
F. S. C. Northrop
PHILOSOPHY is the name for the basic methodological and theoretical assump-
tions of a subject. Since every science uses some method of investigation
and any scientist who reports facts to his colleagues must express these facts
in words and, hence, introduce concepts and theory, it follows that any
science whatever is also a philosophy. When no facts arise, however, to
bring the traditional theory or methods of a subject into question, its problems
are not philosophical. Then to be a scientist one need not also be a philosopher.
Mathematics and physics were in such a state during the two hundred years
following the publication of Newton's Principia in 1686. American law
thought it was in a similar condition when, following Langdell, it introduced
the case method and identified its science with the empirical study of cases.
But whenever facts arise in any subject which bring its traditional theory or
methods into question, at that moment its problems become philosophical.
Then to be an effective scientist one must also be a philosopher. Such has
been the state of mathematics and physics since the end of the nineteenth
century. Such, as this essay indicates, is the state of law at the present time.
The philosophical problems of contemporary law are in part the conse-
quence of the impact upon it of the new philosophy of mathematics, physics,
and language. The late Walter W. Cook, an influential professor during
the 1920's, had studied mathematical physics as well as law. If, he reasoned,
a science as established as physics, with its relatively simple subject matter,
has been forced, not merely to revise its basic assumptions as introduced by
the great Newton, but also to re-examine the conception of its method as
suggested by Newton, how much more is the need for a similar revision of
theory and re-examination of method likely in such a complex subject matter
as that of the social sciences and law? 1 Forthwith a new spirit entered
American legal thinking, and at least one portion of that new legal philosophy
called legal realism was born.
A similar phenomenon has occurred in Great Britain. To understand
* The author is gratefully indebted to the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological
Research for grants which have made this study possible.
1. W. W. Cook, Scientific Method and Law, 13 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL
303 (1927); THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Cambridge,
Mass., 1942).
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it we must examine one of the factors in the late nineteenth century which
turned mathematicians into symbolic logicians and philosophers. Scientists
like Dedekind, Cantor, Frege, Russell, and Whitehead discovered that
supposedly rigorous proofs in their science are far from rigorous. They found
also that part of the trouble centered in the fuzziness of the dx/dy symbol of
the infinitesimal calculus, the main symbolic instrument of modern physics.
This obscurity in their key symbol forced them to pursue a thorough philo-
sophical inquiry into the nature of symbolic meaning generally. Before their
scientific problem was solved even partially, three things had happened. First,
every one of the aforementioned mathematicians found that in order to be a
mathematician he had to investigate philosophical problems. Second, the
technical concepts of mathematics became defined in terms of those of logic;
only then did the aforementioned proofs become rigorous. Third, an entirely
new logic, called symbolic logic, within which traditional mathematics and
traditional logic are but special cases, had to be invented. The present
result is that the Chairman of the Department of Mathematics at Dartmouth
College and many of the research men engaged in the industrial building of
calculating machines and in the military leaders' study of strategy are Ph.D.'s
in philosophy and logic rather than in mathematics. These developments
remind us that as the problems of a subject become philosophical, thereby
turning its experts into philosophers, and as new philosophical solutions of
these problems are found, novel practical consequences ensue. The fourth,
and perhaps most far-reaching result of these developments in mathematics is
the discovery of what Whitehead and Russell have called the "incomplete
symbol." 2
Such symbols have been described by Lord Russell as those which "have
no significance in isolation, but only contribute to the significance of whole
sentences." 3 This failure to possess a meaning when considered by them-
selves means that any science containing incomplete symbols cannot be
understood if it uses only the method that is appropriate for determining
the meaning of its ordinary, or complete, symbols. It is now known that
not merely mathematics and mathematical physics, but also common-sense
language and, hence, in all likelihood, law, contain many incomplete symbols.
This discovery constitutes the major thesis and method of Cambridge and
Oxford analytic philosophy today and of the younger generation of American
philosophers. It has already been introduced into the study of law in Britain
2. A. N. WHITEHEAD & BERTRAND RUSSELL, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA c. 3 (Cambridge,
1925); BERTRAND RUSSELL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY C. 17 (Lon-
don, 1920).
3 BERTRAND RUSSELL, PORTRAITS PROM MEMORY 42 (New York, 1956).
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by Professors Glanville Williams and Graham B. J. Hughes, and by the newly
appointed Regius Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, Mr. H. L. A. Hart,
who, although he trained as a lawyer and practiced at the bar, was at the time
of his appointment Lecturer in Philosophy, undoubtedly on incomplete
symbols, at Oxford University.4
Why are incomplete symbols likely to become important for lawyers?
The answer is simple. Failure to recognize them will result either in the
filling of one's subject matter with nonexistent objects or in the erroneous
conclusion that because many abstract nouns of legal science, such as "right,"
"duty," "obligations," and "justice," do not refer in isolation to concrete
objects for their meaning, they, therefore, have no scientific meaning
whatever. It is the great merit of the American legal realists, in their emphasis
upon concrete cases, facts, and the prediction of facts as a necessary criterion
of conceptual meaning in law, to have avoided the first of these two errors.
It is their weakness, in the opinion of contemporary Scandinavian and British
legal scientists, to have fallen into the second of these errors because of their
failure to note the existence of incomplete symbols.
Consideration of the aforementioned dx/dy symbol of mathematical
physics as it functions in the notation of the differential calculus will show
what is meant. Taken in isolation from the other symbols in this notation,
it might seem to mean a certain number dx, referring, say, to distance,
divided by another number dy, referring to time. As it functions, however,
in the notation of the calculus, dx/dy is the symbol by means of which the
physicist expresses the velocity of an object at a given instant of time t.
Put in more concrete terms, this means that dx/dy is the symbol by means
of which the mathematical physicist expresses the velocity of a train as it
passes, let us say, the Bridgeport station at the instant 8:00 a.m. sharp.
Yet, clearly, there can not be a velocity at an instant since an instant has no
temporal extension, and any velocity requires a stretch of time in order to be.
The question, therefore, arises, What is the meaning of the symbol dx/dy?
If one treats this question with the scientific method the scientist uses to define
the symbol "train," i.e., the method of ostensive definition or denotation in
terms of empirically verifiable and, hence, existent objects, one fills the uni-
verse, as did the early modem mathematicians, with an infinite number of
nonexistent objects called infinitesimals. Clearly, this is nonsense. Yet,
equally clearly, the dx/dy symbol has a very precise scientific meaning, for
4. Glanville Williams, Language and the Law, 61 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 71, 179, 293,
384 (1945); id. 62 at 387 (1946). GRAHAM B. J. HUGHES, JURISPRUDENCE C. 1 (Lon-
don, 1955). H. L. A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW QUARTERLY
REviEw 37 (1954).
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without it the state of a physical system at a given time cannot be expressed,
and, forthwith, the entire exactness and predictive power of physics collapses.
This problem was resolved by distinguishing between complete symbols
such as "train," "station," ".case," "court room," and "judge," which do
have a meaning in isolation that is determined by ostensive reference to, or
by definition in terms of, empirically observable and, hence, existent concrete
objects, and incomplete symbols such as dx/dy, which, as their name implies,
require their relations to other symbols of the expressions in which they occur
to be specified before their precise scientific meaning is made evident. Thus,
in his analysis of the notation of the differential calculus, the mathematician
G. H. Hardy writes that "dy/dx does not mean 'a certain number dy divided
by another number dx': it means 'the result of a certain operation Dx or d/dx
applied to y = 4,(x),' the operation being that of forming the quotient
(4,(x+h)-O(x))/h and making h-3'O. ' ' 5  If the Regius Professor of
Jurisprudence at Oxford is correct, most of the abstract nouns of law, such
as right, obligation, etc., are incomplete symbols, and legal science, conse-
quently, needs a quite different method of analyzing its cases and elucidating
its subject matter from that of either the classical British legal positivists or
the American legal realists.
In any event, two things are clear: (1) The issue between the American
legal realists and Professor Hart's theory of the method appropriate for the
determination of the meaning of legal concepts takes one to very technical
philosophical distinctions and methods. (2) The impact upon British law
of the philosophical solution of the basic problems of mathematics which
arose at the end of the nineteenth century has resulted in at least one person,
Professor Hart, finding it necessary to become a philosopher in order to
understand his own science of law.
Within American legal science other developments enforce a similar con-
clusion. In a recent lecture Professor Arthur L. Corbin described legal
education during the first two decades of this century and his discovery that
its conception of the subject matter of law was erroneous. This conception
was that of the natural law thinkers such as Blackstone and Simeon Baldwin.
According to this philosophy, legal science possessed certain fixed and eternal
principles which supposedly could be found and memorized, and the practice
of law consisted in bringing any concrete case under these principles. With
Langdell at Harvard the case method had been introduced into American
legal study. As Professor Corbin made clear, an examination of the cases
failed to make them fit the traditional Blackstonian natural law formulae.
5. G. H. HARDY, PURE MATHEMATICS 205 (Cambridge, 1928).
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Had you been in the legal philosophy seminar just previous to Professor
Corbin's lecture, you would have heard Professor Wesley Sturges describe
the 3ame phenomenon and his similar reaction to it. Note the questioning
of traditional theoretical assumptions and scientific methods, a sure sign that
the basic problems of one's subject are becoming philosophical.
Surprisingly, however, or perhaps not so surprisingly, the conclusion at
which Professor Sturges arrived in his seminar lecture immediately preceding
the public lecture by Professor Corbin was the direct opposite of the conclu-
sion reached by Professor Corbin. For the latter the application of the
empirical method to the study of statutes and cases takes one to new principles
of law, replacing those of Simeon Baldwin and Blackstone; 6 for Professor
Sturges it results in the conclusion that legal science contains no principles,
either new or old, and that the search for principles is merely an emotive
hang-over from the past which one should get rid of as quickly as possible.
Professor Sturges' work in the field of arbitration 7 and the late Professor
Shulman's recommendation of arbitration rather than litigation under legis-
lative statutes and legal principles in the field of labor law s support this
existentialist philosophy of law-the philosophy which affirms that it is of the
very nature of any concrete case of ethical or legal judgment that it is
particular and unique, and that, hence, one falsifies the very nature of any
dispute if one attempts to resolve it by recourse to universal principles, thereby
treating it as if it were like other disputes.
Why this radical difference in the results of the application of the empirical
scientific method to legal cases upon the part of Professor Corbin and of
Professor Sturges? At least three factors enter into the answer to this question:
(1) the plurality of empirical scientific methods; (2) the impact of sociology,
particularly that of Sumner and Keller, upon Professor Corbin's thinking;
and (3) the importation into the United States from Great Britain of
Austin's positivistic philosophy of law. Let us consider these three factors
in turn.
The method of mathematical physics is certainly empirical. Yet it gives
general principles and universal laws. Hence, empirical physical science is
not existential, after the manner of Professor Sturges' legal science. No
physicist supposes that his scientific task is completed if he merely finds a
particular fact in its unique particularity; he must also find the general prin-
ciple or universally-quantified law of which this fact is an instance. These
universally quantified theoretical principles are, to be sure, never eternal, abso-
6. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, COREIN ON CONTRACTS III-VI (St. Paul, 1950).
7. WESLEY A. STUROES, CASES ON ARBITRATION LAW (Albany, 1953).
8. Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law, 68 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 999 (1955).
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lute and final with respect either to their content as humanly knowable or
to their empirical verification. None the less, there are universal principles,
and it is the business of empirical physical science to find them. Professor
Corbin's theory of empirical legal science clearly fits this conception of scien-
tific method. The philosophy of law and its method which his procedure
rests upon and presupposes is, therefore, essentialism or universalism, rather
than existentialism.
In Professor Corbin's lecture there was more than an occasional reference
to the mores of society. This is the language of sociological jurisprudence and
of Professor Corbin's Yale teacher and friend, the sociologists Sumner and
Keller. Their word mores refers clearly to the normative ordering relations
of the individuals in society and is equivalent to what the anthropologists call
"the pattern of a culture" 9 and the Austrian sociologist of law, Ehrlich,
termed "the living law." 10 Henceforth, we shall follow Ehrlich's usage,
calling Professor Corbin's cases and induced principles "the positive law,"
and his mores of society "the living law."
In any society there are always deviants from the normative ordering
relations of its living law; these deviants, however, constitute a minority. As
the anthropologist Professor E. A. Hoebel has pointed out recently, the living
law of any people is in part a qualitative, and in part a quantitative, or
statistical, concept, because a large percentage of the people, but not all,
habitually follow common qualitative normative principles for ordering their
social relations." Otherwise there would be anarchy rather than society or
culture. This, again, supports Professor Corbin's thesis that, although it is
impossible to find, by an empirical study of legal cases, a single set of prin-
ciples which will fit every case, none the less at any given time a tentative
set of such principles covering the majority of cases can be found. These
principles which must be induced afresh in each generation reflect the
changing mores of the society.
The latter thesis unequivocally connects the positive law with the living
law. Nevertheless, Professor Corbin's description of the legal student's
subject matter restricted it to the positive law alone. The task of legal
science is to take the statutes of the legislature, together with the cases
provided by the courts, and to arrive, by inductive generalization from such
9. RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE (Boston, 1934); A. L. KROEBER, CONFIGURA-
TIONS OF CULTURE GROWTH (Los Angeles, 1944).
10. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Moll
trans]., Cambridge, Mass., 1936).
11. E. A. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN, A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL
DYNAMICS (Cambridge, Mass., 1954). F. S. C. NORTHROP, EUROPEAN UNION AND
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY c. 3 and 6 (New York, 1954).
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materials, at tentative general principles which define the law. In short, the
living law belongs to social and political science, not to legal science; law is
the empirical science of the positive law.
II
But why, if the law is so essentially connected to the mores of society, is
not its study as much concerned with the living law as with the legislative
statutes and the judicial decisions of the positive law? This question brings
us to a third legal philosophy within recent American law: legal positivism.
It derives by way of Thayer of the Harvard Law School from Austin in
England. Professor Corbin and the Yale Law School of Dean Swan's regime
were profoundly influenced by it, as were Judge Learned Hand and Justice
Frankfurter. According to Austin, the subject matter of legal science is the
positive law alone.
In his law-journal articles on Justice Stone and Judge Swan, 12 Judge
Learned Hand describes (a) how Thayer of the Harvard Law School had
become, in the early decades of this century, "the prophet of a new approach"
to the judge's concept of his role in interpreting the Bill of Rights and (b)
how this new approach captured "young Stone" as a law student, dominated
Dean and Judge Swan's thinking, and after spreading from the Harvard of
Thayer's time throughout the United States, finally became the opinion of
the majority on the Supreme Court. According to this new legal philosophy,
as described by Judge Hand, "the Bill of Rights could not be treated like
ordinary law; its directions were to be understood rather as admonitions to
forbearance" to the electorate and the legislators. Dominated by this Aus-
tinian legal positivism of Thayer, which equates the legally just with the will
of the legislature, the majority of the new Court found it not merely possible
but also necessary in principle, if they were to be jurists of scientific integrity,
to depart from the older Court's precedents in which majority-approved social
legislation was declared to be unconstitutional because it conflicted with "the
due process clause" of the Bill of Rights; thereby the new social legislation
became law. Justice Douglas, who participated officially in these events,
refers also to Thayer in support of his and the majority of the Court's action. 13
These historical events, explicitly mentioned and described by Judge Hand
12. Learned Hand, Chief Justice Stone's Concept of the Judicial Function, 46 COLUMBIA
LAW REVIEW 696 (1946); Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE LAW JOURNAL 167 (1947),
republished in THE SPIRIT op LIBERTY 201-219 (DiUiard ed., New York, 1953).
13. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES, STUDIES IN AMERICAN AND INDIAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW FROM MARSHALL TO MUKHERJEA 430, n. 2 (New York, 1956).
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and Justice Douglas, demonstrate that a shift in the basic philosophy of law--
in this instance the shift from the natural law philosophy of Blackstone,
Simeon Baldwin, and the Old Court to the positivistic philosophy of law of
Austin, Thayer, Judges Hand and Swan, and the majority of Justices of
the New Court-results in an epoch-making difference in the way a concrete
case is decided. Clearly, cases alone, or even cases, the Bill of Rights, and
the legislative statutes together, are not enough; the philosophy of law which
the judge or the legal scientist brings to the cases, the Constitution, the Bill
of Rights, and the legislative statutes is equally important. In fact, it is all-
important since it determines the interpretation that is put upon the Bill
of Rights, the legislative statute, and the case.
Why does the positivistic philosophy of law have such an effect? To
answer this question we must go back beyond Thayer to Austin.
Law, according to Austin, is identified with the commands or will of the
sovereign,' 4 where this will is indivisible and legally unlimited.'15 It follows
that legal sovereignty cannot be divided between the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of government, but must be located completely in one
of them. In a society, therefore, whose living law is monarchical, this
definition of law requires the placing of the whole of the government's
sovereignty in the executive branch, i.e., an absolute monarch. In a society
where living law is democratic, it necessitates similarly that the whole of
political sovereignty must be placed in the legislative branch. From this,
three things follow: (1). The executive becomes merely the spokesman for,
and executive officer of, the majority in the legislature. This is the case
in Great Britain and in Free India. (2) The judiciary becomes merely the
instrument for taking the will of the legislature as expressed in its statutes
as the sole meaning of law and for applying this purely statutory positive law
to the settling of disputes; all previous judicial decisions, if scientifically
correct, being such applications of the legislature's absolute and legally
unlimited will. Hence, the epoch-making effect upon recent American politics
and United States Supreme Court decisions of the British positivistic philoso-
phy of law which came into this country through Thayer.
Austin's legal positivism has one other consequence. Since it equates
the whole of law with a sovereign will which is legally unlimited, thereby
restricting, in a democratic society, the tasks of advocates and judges to the
application of the legislative statutes to concrete cases, it follows that (3)
14. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF
THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE (new edition, with an Introduction by H. L. A. Hart) 1-33,
123, 132-133, 193-194, 253-254 (London, 1954).
15. Id. at 254. See also HUGHES, op. cit. at 4 supra, 71.
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the subject matter of legal science is nothing but the positive law. In all
probability, it is the influence of legal positivism upon Professor Corbin and
the Yale Law School of Dean Swan's era which led Professor Corbin in his
recent lecture to equate the study of law with the inducing of general princi-
ples from the positive statutes and cases, notwithstanding his explicit recog-
nition of the essential connection between the positive law and the living law.
In a society such as that of Great Britain or the United States where the
positive law has arisen out of its own living law, such a training of future
advocates and judges will result perhaps in but minor errors and inadequacies.
Today, however, British and American law schools contain a large number
of students from non-Anglo-American societies. Also, British and American
lawyers are being constantly called upon to advise the political and legal
leaders of such countries upon the effective introduction of modem Western
positive law. The living law of these non-Western societies is not that of
Great Britain or the United States. The task, therefore, confronting both
these foreign law students when they return to their native people and the
American and British legal advisers to such people is that of applying modern
Western liberal democratic positive law to peoples with a quite different living
law. For such legal demands, a philosophy of law and a legal education
which equates the whole of legal science with nothing but the positive law
is quite inadequate. It appears, therefore, that a law school which provides
its students with the legal skills for meeting the legal demands that are likely
to be placed upon them in today's world must have a richer and more complex
philosophy of law and its scientific methods than legal positivism provides.
More specifically, three things must be taught: (1). the method of legal
positivism for determining the positive law; (2) the method of sociological
jurisprudence for determining the living law of any society; and (3) the
method or art, yet to be specified, for making (1) effective in (2) when the
norms of (1) and (2) differ. 16
What is the method of sociological jurisprudence for determining the
living law? A reading of the works of Dean Emeritus Roscoe Pound, who
was the first to introduce this sociological philosophy of law into the United
States, and of Ehrlich, who following upon Savigny, pioneered in this phi-
losophy of legal science in Europe, will show that they threw very little light
upon the scientific method which the sociologically trained lawyer is to use
to determine the living law.
It is the great merit of Underhill Moore that he saw this weakness in
the traditional sociological jurisprudence and made the first constructive
16. For a discussion of the latter problem, see the writer's THE TAMING OF THE NATIONS
c. 7 and 9 (New York, 1952).
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attempt to remove it.17 Like Walter Wheeler Cook, he was aware that
modem scientific method is a very much more philosophically subtle and
complicated thing than many social scientists and lawyers realize. This led
Moore to study the method of modem physics in its complexity and to bring
philosophers of natural science into his seminar on legal theory and method
to help him in this task.
Modem physicists had found it necessary to do the same thing. When
the Michelson-Morley experiment of 1885 revealed an indubitable fact which
simply should not exist on the theoretical assumptions concerning space and
time of Maxwell's and Newton's physics, and Einstein became convinced that
those assumptions must be modified in a fundamental manner, he was
confronted with a methodological difficulty. Newton, when he suggested
that he made, no hypotheses and that he had deduced the concepts of his
physics from the experimental data, left the impression that a proper concep-
tion of scientific method was one in which there were no theoretical assump-
tions which the experimental facts did not give or logically necessitate. On
this conception of scientific method, Newton's basic theoretical assumptions
simply could not be wrong. Thus, Einstein found himself forced to carry
through a philosophical analysis of the relation between the data of experi-
mental physics and the concepts of its theory.
Einstein once told me that it was his reading of the philosopher Hume
which convinced him that Newton's conception of scientific method was false,
and which, therefore, gave him the courage to suggest an alteration in
Newton's basic assumptions. What Hume made clear to Einstein, and
what Hume makes clear to anybody who reads him with care, is the
restricted meaning of causality, different from that of physics, and the limited
set of notions with which one would be left if one based scientific knowledge
on nothing but the directly sensed facts themselves and what they logically
imply. This reading of Hume convinced Einstein that modem physics is
impossible unless certain concepts going beyond the observed facts are intro-
duced speculatively and constructively and tested only indirectly by way of
their deductive consequences.' 8 Then it was not merely possible, but also
methodologically proper, to replace Newton's theoretical assumptions with
a different set from which Newton's theory derives logically as a special
case, applying to certain of the experimental facts but not to all of them.
17. Underhill Moore & Charles C. Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study in
Legal Control, 53 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1-136 (1943).
18. See ALBERT EINSTEIN, THE WORLD AS I SEE IT 35-36 (New York, 1935); also the
writer's Einstein's Conception of Science in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, 8 Li-
BRAR' OF LIVING PHILOSOPHERS C. 14 (1949).
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In short, before Einstein had cleared up the problems raised by the Michelson-
Morley experiment of 1885, the modem physicist not only found himself with
a new philosophical theory of time and of space and of their relations to
one another and to matter, but also with a new philosophical analysis of
the complex nature of scientific method and the relation between its
theoretical concepts and the observed data.
It was this enriched conception of scientific method which Underhill
Moore introduced into sociological jurisprudence in order to provide not
only the lawyer but also the sociologist with a trustworthy method for deter-
mining the living law of any culture. His use of this method was not born
merely of the desire to ape physicists. There were reasons for it within the
very nature of sociological jurisprudence itself. He reasoned that if the
claim of sociological jurisprudnce is correct it should provide a specific scien-
tific method for determining what the living law is in an objective manner
which is quite independent of the private preferences and enthusiasm for
reform of the observer, and equally independent of the method used to
determine the positive law. If it is to be of any practical use, it must also
be applicable to the norms of social behavior beside the Yale Law School on
the streets of New Haven. Furthermore, if the living law has any relevance
to the positive law, it ought to be possible, for example, by going out into the
banks of New Haven, New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, to
determine the high frequency order of the transactions between the people
in these social institutions and then to compare this normative order of the
living law with that based upon the norms of the positive law to find out what
this relevance is. In his earlier, "institutional" studies he used the common-
sense terms of a merely inductive natural-history scientist. 19 The results were
sufficient to convince him in a rough way that the thesis of sociological
jurisprudence was confirmed. He found, for example, in judicial disputes
of three factually similar cases in commercial law appearing in the state
courts of Pennsylvania, New York, and South Carolina that the norms of
the living law supported the judicial decisions of the three cases, in which
two of the state courts gave the verdict one way and the third court gave it
the opposite way. He became convinced, nevertheless, that the empirical
method he had used involved too many intuitive judgments to be adequate
as a method for sociological jurisprudence.
He then shifted his studies to car-parking habits of people on the streets
of New Haven. He soon found that, when he allowed observers to use
19. Underhill Moore, Institutional Studies, 38 YALE LAW JOURNAL 703 (1929); 40 YALE
LAW JOURNAL 381, 555, 752, 928, 1055, 1219 (1931); 42 YALE LAW JOURNAL 817, 1198
(1933); 45 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1, 260 (1935).
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ordinary extemporized prose to describe such an apparently objective phe-
nomenon, different observers failed to give similar descriptions of what
occurred. This convinced Moore that extemporized prose will not do in
sociological jurisprudence. By such means, in the name of the objective
living law, a sociological jurisprudent can smuggle in his own particular
arbitrary normative preferences and prejudices. However human this may
be, this dearly is not science, either social or legal. Thus, sociological
jurisprudence itself called for the more philosophically subtle and conceptually
precise scientific method which mathematical physics might provide.
A second consideration suggested the same conclusion. It has been noted
that legal positivism identifies the legally just with the positive law. To say
that anything is just is to say that it is either a statute of the legislature or a
judicial decision or act which is in accordance with such a statute. From
this it follows that there is no meaning in legal science for saying that the
positive law is illegal or unjust.2 0 Sociological jurisprudence has the merit
of providing a criterion for judging the justice of the positive law. This is
possible because of its extension of the subject matter of legal science from
the positive law to the living law. This permits the sociological jurist to define
good or just positive law as that positive law whose norms conform to the
empirically determined objective norms of the living law. Positive law is bad
when, with changes in the living law, the positive law, due to its principle of
stare decisis, lags behind the evolving new norms of the living law.
Suppose, however, as was probably the case in Germany immediately
before World War II, that the empirical study of its living law would reveal
it to embody, with high statistical frequency, the norms of Hitler and his
cohorts. Consider also the unanimous United States Supreme Court decision
on segregation in education. The latter decision passed legal judgment not
merely on the positive legislation, but also on the living law, of the Southern
States. These considerations make it clear that an adequate legal science
must provide a meaningful criterion for judging the legality of the living, as
well as the positive, law. Can sociological jurisprudence do this?
Clearly, one cannot identify the criterion for judging today's living law
with the "is" of today's living law itself. Such a procedure would make the
"is" of the living law of Hitler's Germany or of the Southern States just.
Nevertheless, a sociological jurisprudential criterion suggests itself. This
criterion is to identify the standard for measuring today's living law with
the "is" of what tomorrow's living law is going to be. But if this criterion is
to be scientifically specifiable, legal science must have a scientific method such
20. See Austin, op. cit. at 14 supra, 184, 260-261.
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that, given the objective determination of today's living law, this method
enables one to deduce today what tomorrow's living law will be. This is
precisely what the method of modem physics accomplishes. In Newton's
physics, for example, given the positions and momenta of the masses of an
isolated system today, the method and theory enable one to deduce what
their positions and momenta will be tomorrow. This is the second considera-
tion within sociological jurisprudence itself which led Moore to turn to the
method of mathematical physics.
This method requires not merely inductive observation, experimentation
and concrete operational definitions, but also abstract, axiomatically
constructed, deductively formulated and indirectly verified theory. Moore
went at least part way toward achieving a legal science with such a method
by basing his sociological jurisprudence on the behavioristic psychology of
Clark Hull,2 1 which had been given a rigorous axiomaticized deductive
formulation.22
When Underhill Moore's observers of car parking in New Haven described
what they saw in terms of the concepts of this theory, they brought back
similar reports of the situations which they observed. Thus, the first of
the difficulties in traditional sociological jurisprudence-that of keeping the
observer's subjective preference and normative prejudices out of his descrip-
tion of the living law-was removed. When, however, using the assump-
tions of this method and theory, Moore and his colleague Professor Charles
C. Callahan attempted to find a mathematical formula connecting the present
living law to the future living law, even for such a simple social phenomenon
as car parking on the streets of New Haven, the theory did not give such
a formula as a postulate or deduced theorem. Nor did Moore and Callahan
succeed in finding even an empirically satisfactory formula.
It is one of the greatest tributes to Underhill Moore that he never fooled
himself about what he did, confusing claims for sociological jurisprudence
with its methodological achievements. He was one of the most honest men
who ever lived, and, because of this honesty with respect to what he did
achieve and what he did not achieve, he provides the touchstone for judging
contemporary legal theory. His work showed that sociological jurisprudence
did not have a method for judging the living law.
Since, as previously noted, most of the societies in the world today,
including even the United States in the segregation case, are requiring their
lawyers and judges to advise and pass legal judgment on both the positive
21. C. L. HULL, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR (New York, 1943).
22. C. L. HULL, C. I. HOVLAND, R. T. Ross, M. HALL, D. T. PERKINS & F. B. FITCH,
MATHEMATICO-DEDUCTIVE THEORY OF ROTE LEARNING (New Haven, 1940).
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and the living law, it appears, therefore, that contemporary legal science must
embrace more than even legal positivism and sociological jurisprudence. One
can no more get the criterion of the "ought" for judging the "is" of the living
law out of the "is" of the living law of sociological jurisprudence than
one can get the criterion of the "ought" for judging the "is" of the positive
law out of the "is" of the positive law of legal positivism. In fact, there
is a logical, as well as a methodological, block in the way. The logical
difficulty is that the "ought" for judging the "is" of a particular subject
matter cannot be found in the "is" of that subject matter itself. Sociological
jurisprudence falls short when lawyers and judges are forced, as is the case
today, to pass judgment on the "is" of the living law. Put positively, this
means that legal science must affirm certain propositions to be true
independently of and logically antecedent to both the positive law and the
living law.
The problem, however, is to give methodological and objectively verifiable
content to this thesis. The only factor in human experience and scientific
knowledge fulfilling this condition is nature and natural man, i.e., those
facts in human experience, present in any society or culture, which are not
the result of the beliefs of man and their deeds as directed by these beliefs.
The thesis that there are scientifically verifiable theories of such facts and that
such theory provides a criterion for measuring both the positive and the
living law is the distinguishing mark of natural law jurisprudence.
The doctrine of natural rights of the Declaration of Independence and of
the Bill of Rights as interpreted by the courts before the advent of Thayer's
legal positivism is one example of such a philosophy of natural law-the
philosophy, namely, of Jefferson, who wrote the Declaration of Independence
and who, because he was as fearful of tyranny of the legislature as he was
of a tyranny of the executive or the judiciary, insisted on a mixed form of
government and upon adding a Bill of Rights to the Constitution.23 To
Jefferson's natural law jurisprudence we shall return in the sequel.
The limitations of the sociological jurisprudence of Underhill Moore
showed in one other way. His grounding of it in the deductively formulated
behavioristic psychology of Hull required a spatio-temporal description of
the objective movements of every individual in a given social system in order
to determine a living law of that system at a given moment. This was
practical for the car parkings in a few blocks on the streets of New Haven.
It is quite impractical for specifying the living law of 350,000,000 people in
23. THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 34, 189, 440 (Boyd ed., Princeton, 1955). Cf.
Claude G. Bowers, Jefferson and the Bill of Rights, 41 VIRGINiA LAW REVIEW 709, 720
(1955).
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contemporary India. Thus, even for determining the "is" of the living law,
to say nothing about providing a criterion for judging its justice and for
reforming it, his method for sociological jurisprudence is inadequate.
None the less, even with the method of natural law jurisprudence, a more
adequate method for determining the living law of sociological jurisprudence
is required. Otherwise the lawyer does not appreciate the living habits and
customs of the people which must be reckoned with in an effective application
of new positive law, or new natural law principles of reform, to a given people.
There are reasons for believing that contemporary cultural anthropology and
the philosophy of culture have found the required method for determining
the living law of sociological jurisprudence.
Ehrlich defined the living law as "the inner order of the associations"
of people in a society. Put more concretely, this means that the social norms
with which law is dealing are not determined by any particular fact or
factor in human experience, such as man's economic needs, his sexual desires,
or his physical power, but with the way in which all these and other facts
are related and put together. It is not any particular fact, but the "inner
order" of all the facts, that constitutes the living law. Ehrlich's "inner order,"
let it be recalled, is equivalent to what anthropologists call the "pattern" of
a culture. Professor A. L. Kroeber, speaking for anthropologists generally,
notes also that "Values... are intimately associated with the most basic and
implicit patterning of the phenomena of culture." 2 4
The words "pattern" and "inner order" are, however, metaphors; they
do not refer to concrete facts, nor are they scientific concepts with a literal
meaning in isolation. The pattern of a culture is hardly something concrete
which one can observe after the manner in which one sees the terrain of a
river valley from an airplane. At best, the words "pattern" and "inner
order" are incomplete symbols. Hence, the scientific method of determining
the inner order or the pattern of a culture must be complex; it cannot be
that of direct observation, even though empirical observation of a people
and their culture is obviously required. What is this complex method?
Anthropological science provides the answer to this question, as does
independent work in the comparative philosophy of the world's cultures.
Anthropologists first thought, after the manner of those legal realists
who rejected theory for the empirical study of cases, that the method of
anthropological science consisted merely in going into the field to live with
a particular people or tribe and to observe what one sees and hears. After
many years of such observing and the writing of scientific reports, a few
24. AN APPRAISAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 373 (ed. by Sol Tax, Loren C. Eiseley,
Irving Rouse, & Carl F. Voegelin, Chicago, 1953).
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anthropologists suddenly awoke to the fact that they had been misunder-
standing the facts which they observed and described. They discovered,
moreover, that this occurred because they had been describing and conceiving
of what they saw the native people doing in concepts brought to the observed
facts by the anthropologist himself, instead of in the way these facts were
thought of and, hence, understood and ordered by the native people. Paul
Radin among the first and Professor Clyde Kluckhohn later discovered that
in order to specify objectively the living norms and customs of a people,
empirical anthropology has to determine their basic mentality. When Pro-
fessor Kluckhohn did this for his Navaho, he found himself confronted with
a complete Navaho philosophy.25 The anthropologist Professor Cornelius
Osgood found also that he had to attend even to the epistemology of the
native people's way of knowing anything 2 6 It is any people's sharing of their
particular philosophical way of describing, ordering, integrating, and antici-
pating the raw facts of their experience which makes their culture and its
living and positive law what it is. Professor Hoebel comes to a similar
conclusion in his study of seven different primitive peoples and their
significantly different living laws. Methodologically he finds also that
anthropological science and comparative sociological jurisprudence, in deter-
mining the pattern or living law of a given people or culture, must combine
inductive observation of their features, ceremonies, and behavior with a
deductive specification of their common philosophical assumptions, these
common assumptions differing from culture to culture and from tribe to
tribe.27 Studies in the comparative philosophy of the world's cultures lead
to the same conclusion. 28 It appears, therefore, that not only are the basic
and most pressing problems of contemporary law philosophical as well as
scientific in character, but even the scientific method of sociological and
anthropological jurisprudence is itself philosophical, being that, in part at
least, of the philosophy of culture.
25. Clyde Kluckhohn, The Philosophy of the Navaho Indians, in IDEOLOGICAL DIFFER-
ENCES AND WORLD ORDER C. 17 (Northrop ed., New Haven, 1949).
26. Cornelius Osgood, Culture: Its Empirical and Non-empirical Character, 7 SOUTH-
WESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGY 202-214 (1951).
27. See note 11, supra.
28. F. S. C. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST (New York, 1947); The Im-
portance of Deductively Formulated Theory in Ethics and Social and Legal Science, in
STRUCTURE, METHOD, AND MEANING, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HENRY M. SHEFFER 99-114
(New York, 1951).
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III
It is not merely with respect to the general theoretical and methodological
assumptions of its science that contemporary law faces inescapable philo-
sophical problems and tasks. Philosophical issues appear also in technical
portions of the positive law itself. Brief consideration of some recent decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States will make this clear.
It has been noted that the government of the United States is a mixed
government and that the theory of law of its founding fathers was that of a
natural rights and a natural law philosophy. According to this theory, certain
things are true before the legislature, the courts, or the executive come into
existence. Hence, these truths, expressed in the Declaration of Independence
and the Bill of Rights, provide principles for the courts to use in judging
legislative statutes as to their justice or injustice and even for judging the
living law from which these positive legislative statutes derive.
Jefferson tells us that his three gods were Bacon, Newton, and Locke.2 9
The presence of Newton in this trinity indicates that Jefferson drew from
the theory of the natural philosopher as well as that of the social scientist
and humanist for the criterion of his legal, moral, political, and even religious
thinking. The philosophy of nature and natural men as well as the philosophy
of society and cultural man is functioning in his criterion of the morally good
and the legally just.
For our present purposes, the most significant person in Jefferson's trinity
is Locke. It was Locke who gave the natural law philosophy of Jefferson
and our founding fathers its particular modem content. In his classic
treatise Of Civil Government, Locke affirms that the sole justification of the
existence of government is the preservation of the property of the individual.3 0
In reading this statement today we must remember that he meant by property
man's own body and person as well as what man has achieved by applying
his labor to the God-given materials of nature. In short, Locke's concept of
property includes personal rights, as well as property rights in the narrower
sense. From this theory of government, Locke draws the conclusion that it
would be a contradiction in terms for the government to take any property
away from the individual, since the sole justification for the existence of
government is the preservation of the property of the individual. 3 '
29. THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 609 (Koch & Peden ed.,
Modern Library, New York, 1944).
30. JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 183 (Everyman's Library, London, 1940).
31. Id. at 187.
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Here we have a philosophy of government and law which provides a
basis for judicial review of legislative statutes and for the interpretation of
the Bill of Rights, not, after the manner of Judge Hand and the legal
positivists, as "merely admonitions of forbearance" or "counsels of perfection"
to the electorate and the legislators, but as legal principles to be used by
the courts to judge the justice and legality of the statutes of the States and
of Congress. Any legislation, regardless of the size of the majority behind
it, which takes away from the individual any of the personal or property rights
specified in the Declaration of Independence and in the Bill of Rights, violates
the raison d'etre of the legislature's very existence and, hence, is illegal. The
dissents of Justices Black and Douglas in the Feinberg Law case 3 2 make
such an argument and, hence, require such a natural rights philosophy for
their justification. Undoubtedly, it was a natural law philosophy with Lockean
and Jeffersonian content with respect to property rights that convinced the
judges of the so-called "Old" Supreme Court of their rectitude in using the
"due process" clause of the Bill of Rights to declare majority-approved social
legislation unconstitutional.
Similarly, as noted above, it is the rejection of any natural law juris-
prudence, whether of Locke, Jefferson, Blackstone, or St. Thomas, by (a)
the American legal realists and (b) Thayer and his Harvardian legal
positivists that not merely freed, but also required, the New Court to depart
from the precedents of the past and to declare the new social legislation
legal. If, as legal positivism affirms, law is the will of the legislature as sole,
undivided and unlimited sovereign, then the law of contradiction appears
with new content, and it becomes self-contradictory to declare a legislative
statute illegal.33
Curiously, not to say paradoxically, Justice Douglas, who presupposes a
natural rights and natural law philosophy in his dissent in the Feinberg Law
case, appeals to Thayer and legal positivism in justification of his position
with the majority of the Justices on the new social legislation.3 4 But if legal
positivism is correct, then his dissent in the Feinberg Law case is an error,
since according to legal positivism the content of the sovereign legislature's
will as expressed in its statutes--whether they refer to social legislation or to
personal rights is irrelevant-is the sole criterion of what is legal. The fact
that it is the sovereign's will is all that matters.
The main point in this reference to Justice Douglas is not to point up the
foregoing inconsistency. It should be evident at this point in this paper that
32. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 496-497, 508-511 (1951).
33. See AUSTiN, op. cit. supra, note 14, at 260-261.
34. See note 13 supra.
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no one has a single consistent theory of law that is adequate for all its needs
and cases. As Justice Holmes noted, life is bigger than any legal theory.
The point, instead, is to show that even a particular branch of positive law
itself, namely, U. S. constitutional law, exhibits a problem which is inescapably
philosophical in character, the philosophical issue, namely, between the
philosophy of natural rights and natural law which Justices Black and
Douglas and our founding fathers believe an adequate legal protection of
life's civil liberties requires and the positivistic philosophy of law which these
two Justices and the majority of the present Court believe an effective
democratic solution of life's social problems calls for.
Let no one suppose that Justices Douglas and Black are the only people
for whom this philosophical problem is real. Consider what happens,
assuming a judge guided by legal positivism, if the majority in the legislature
pass a statute making it a crime for an individual dissenter to practice his
particular religious faith and convictions. Even Justice Frankfurter,
notwithstanding his Harvardian and Oxfordian legal positivism, finds it
difficult to stay with its implications at this point, as his dissent in the
Feinberg Law case, even though on positivistic procedural grounds, shows.3 5
Yet, if, as legal positivism affirms, justice is equated with the will of the
undivided sovereign, then whatever the will of the legislature is, whether its
statutes refer to personal or to property rights, the legislative statute is just.
The question, therefore, cannot be escaped: What is going to happen to
American civil liberties, to the supposedly basic and inalienable rights of
freedom of worship and freedom of scientific, philosophic, political, or
religious belief, if the positivistic legal philosophy, to which the present
Supreme Court appeals to justify its decisions on social legislation, increases
its hold upon legal education and lawyers and judges generally?
Consider also the recent unanimous decision on segregation in education.
Insofar as there were any legislative statutes affecting the case, they were
those of the Southern States which, if the legal positivist's identification of
the legally just with a legislative statute be true, made segregation in education
just in those States. Furthermore, Congress had provided the Federal Courts
with no federal legislative statute making educational segregation in the
positive or living law of any state a crime. Consequently, had the Supreme
Court's Justices consistently applied the positivistic legal philosophy which
they use to justify their decisions on social legislation, they would have had
to conclude that insofar as there was any law or justice relevant to the case,
it was that of the Southern State legislatures, and that insofar as any Federal
35. 342 U. S. 497-508 (1951).
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Court is concerned, since there is no federal legislative statute making segre-
gated education in the positive or living law of any state a crime, the Supreme
Court of the United States, or any other federal court, has no jurisdiction
in the case. In short, the positivistic philosophy of law to which a majority
of the Justices appeal to justify their decisions on social) legislation is
incompatible with their unanimous decision on segregation in education.
The situation is better, but still unsatisfactory, if one considers this decision
from the standpoint of the sociological philosophy of law. An examination
of the original living law of this country and of its Southern component
enables us, at least, to understand what has happened-namely, the general
approval of the decision from the country as a whole and the bitterness with
respect to it in the Southern States.
New England was founded in major part by nonconformist Protestants
who came to the western hemisphere to escape from the rule of the religious
majority in Europe and who, like Jefferson, were heavily under the influence
of the philosophy of natural rights and natural law of Locke.3 6 With the
opening of the frontier, this living law spread to the Middle West and the
Far West. It is exceedingly unlikely that legal positivism has seeped down
from Thayer to the masses to a sufficient extent to alter this original and
basic philosophy of American culture. The coming of Roman Catholics in
large numbers brought in a natural law philosophy also. These two portions
of the living law of the United States constitute a statistical majority of the
people. Sociological jurisprudence tells us that when a positive legal decision
has such qualitative and quantitative support from the living law it can come
into being and be effective. Hence, this legal philosophy enables us to
understand why, even though there was no positive federal legislative statute
on the matter, the unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court
has occurred without a bitter reaction from the majority of the people.
In the Southeastern States, however, an additional, quite different living
law came into being through the founders of the Virginia Company and
their blood and cultural descendants who spread out to the South and
Southwest. The English scholar Mr. Peter Laslett has recently shown that
this living law derives from the Patriarcha of Sir Robert Filmer,37 instead of
from Locke and Jefferson. According to this patriarchal ethics and law,
good government is government by the first families, and a good educational
system is one modeled after seventeenth-century Episcopal Oxford and
Cambridge-a system in which the best education goes to those carrying
36. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST 71 (New York, 1947).
37. Snt ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA 1-46 (Laslett ed., Oxford, 1949).
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the greatest familial and social responsibility, namely, sons rather than
daughters, the eldest son rather than the younger son because of primogeniture,
and, with few exceptions, the sons of the first families only. Equality of
education for all, regardless of status and blood of birth, is foreign to the
political, legal, and educational ideals of such a society. Jefferson's Lockean
democratic egalitarianism modified this aristocratic patriarchal Filmerian
living law of the South, but it never removed it.
Sociological jurisprudence tells us that when a positive law decision resting
on one norm conflicts with living-law norms to the contrary, the positive
law tends to be ineffective. The Prohibition Amendment is an example.
Hence, the bitterness in parts of the South at the Supreme Court's decision.
Thus, although the sociological philosophy of law explains how the
Supreme Court decision could occur without a federal legislative statute and
indicates that it will have support from the country as a whole, it must also
affirm that the decision is not law so far as the living law of the South is
concerned. At the very least, a lawyer or judge guided solely by sociological
jurisprudence might well have counselled living-law changes from below
rather than a positive-law decision from above.
It appears, therefore, as with the dissents of Justices Black and Douglas
in the Feinberg Law case, that the only philosophy of law which will justify
the unanimous Supreme Court decision in the segregation-in-education case
is one which affirms that legal science contains certain principles that are
true independent of and antecedent to the positive or the living law, and that
any positive legislative statute or living law custom which violates these
principles is illegal. But, as noted above, the traditional philosophy of natural
law of the United States is that of Locke, Jefferson, Blackstone, and Baldwin.
This theory of law produced the Old Court and would probably require the
present Court to follow old precedents in declaring recent social legislation
to be unconstitutional.
Again we see how positive legal decisions of one and the same set of
Justices in one and the same Supreme Court exhibit inescapable philosophical
issues and problems. In fact, on any existent theory of legal science, it is very
difficult to make the specific decisions of the present Supreme Court of the
United States on social legislation, civil liberties, and segregation in education
lie down consistently together.
Hence, the most pressing issue confronting positive American constitu-
tional law and liberal democratic institutions generally is at bottom a philo-
sophical as well as a legal problem. This problem is nothing less than that
of so reconstructing the theoretical and methodological assumptions of legal
science that a judge of scientific integrity will be free to allow the new social
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legislation, without which democracy will fail, to stand, while at the same
time not so tying the hands of the judge that by default of jurisdiction he will
fail to protect the natural rights and civil liberties of individuals without which,
also, there is neither liberty nor democracy.
The foregoing analysis suggests that a natural law jurisprudence with
a content different from that of Locke and our founding fathers is required
for such an undertaking. Even so, if this new philosophy of natural law
ignores the living law of sociological jurisprudence, it will fail. Similarly, a
sociological jurisprudence which does not implement itself through a
reconstruction of the positive law will betray mankind also by failing to bring
the available living cultural and moral resources of the world to bear upon
the peaceful resolution of the disputes of men and nations. In an atomic age,
such a failure is a serious thing.
Law is, indeed, a complex subject-more complex than any traditional
theory has supposed. It has at least three parts, each with its particular
scientific and philosophical method: (1) positive law, (2) living law, and
(3) natural law.
In the Anglo-American common law world the scientific method for
studying the positive law is inductive generalization, of the natural-history
type, from particular cases and statutes, combined with the elucidation of
the resulting legal concepts by the method of contemporary analytic
philosophy. The latter philosophical method is required because the most
important legal concepts are incomplete symbols. In the civil law tradition
of the Continental European nations, Scotland, Quebec, and Louisiana, the
method of determining the positive law is different. Instead of beginning
with individual cases and applying to them the method of classification and
case-by-case inductive generalization of the natural-history type of scientific
procedure, the civil law must be approached, in most, at least, of its parts,
with the deductively formulated theory of the method and mentality of
mathematical physics as one's model. 38 Our earlier references to Professor
Sturges remind us that there is a third type of positive law with its still different
method. Treating each dispute as unique, it dispenses with legislative statutes,
legal principles, and litigation, to settle disputes by the methods of arbitration
and mediation. 39 This was the preferred method of positive legal procedure
38. See F. H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LooKS AT THE CIvIL LAW (Ann Arbor,
1955) and this writer's review of it, 54 MICHIGAN LAW REVmW 1029-1039 (1956).
39. CHIANG MONLIN, TIDES FROM THE WEST 255-256 (New Haven, 1947). F. S. C.
NORTHROP, THE TAMING OF THE NATIONS C. 7 (New York, 1952); The Philosophy of
Natural Science and Natural Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL Asso-
CIATION 5-25 (1952).
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in classical Confucian China. Gandhi turned to it in his South African
period.40 With the present vogue of philosophical existentialism, nominalism,
and ethical subjectivism, accompanied by the increasing influence of Asia with
its anti-litigational, mediational ethic of peace-making, this positive legal
method is likely to take on increasing importance in the days to come.
The scientific method for determining the living law is that of deductively
formulated and indirectly verified theory, as used in contemporary cultural
anthropology and the comparative philosophy of the world's cultutes. The
scientific method of natural law jurisprudence is that of the philosophy of
the scientifically verified theories of natural science, including psychology,
when the latter science restricts itself to those facts about man that are
logically antecedent to, and independent of, the cultural differences between
men. Those psychological facts that are culturally relative belong to social
psychology and to sociological jurisprudence, not to the psychology of natural
man and to natural law jurisprudence.
* Clearly, contemporary law is a challenging subject. Its challenge, more-
over, appears to be inescapably philosophical with respect to both theory
and method.
40. M. K. GANDHI, GANDHI'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY, THE STORY OF My EXPERIMENTS WITH
TRUTH 167-168 (Washington, 1948); F. S. C. NORTHROP, Gandhi's Way to Peace, in THE
TAMING OF THE NATIONS C. 4.
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